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The links among characteristics, controls and performance of interfirm innovation projects
Abstract
This study aims to explore the effects of: 1) the project characteristics of asset specificity, uncertainty
and complexity on the performance of, and, the use of formal and social controls in inter-firm innovation
projects, and, 2) the use of formal and social controls on the performance of inter-firm innovation
projects. In addition, the mediating role of the use of formal and social controls in the relationships
between the characteristics and performance of inter-firm innovation projects is also examined. Survey
data from 75 organizations in innovation–active industries in Australia were analysed using the
structural equation modelling with the Partial Least Square technique. The results show that uncertainty
and complexity affected performance of inter-firm innovation projects, but in opposite directions.
Higher levels of uncertainty were associated with less use of social controls but higher levels of
complexity were partnered with a greater use of both formal and social controls. The use of formal and
social controls individually impacted on inter-firm innovation project performance. Finally, the use of
formal and social controls played a partial mediating role in the relationships of uncertainty and
complexity with inter-firm innovation performance. Responding to gaps in research, this study clarifies
that asset specificity may be irrelevant whilst uncertainty and complexity may be highly relevant in the
performance of, and, the use of controls in inter-firm innovation projects. The study offers valuable
insights into how a complementary use of controls contributes to the performance of inter-firm
innovation projects.
Keywords: asset specificity; uncertainty; complexity; formal controls; social controls; inter-firm
innovation project performance.
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1. Introduction
Innovation is a process whereby organizations transform ideas into new or improved
products, service or processes in order to advance, compete and differentiate themselves
successfully in the marketplace (Baragheh, et al., 2009; Dodgson et al., 2002). Innovation
m a y be more severe and difficult to control than other organizational processes and
transactions because of its characteristics of newness and change (Kerssens-van Drongelen
and Bilderbeek, 2009; Zhao, 2003). It is about “taking advantage of exceptions;
experimenting, failing and succeeding; uncertainty and volatility; inefficiencies; adapting
to unforeseen opportunities; and foremost creativity” (Davila et al., 2009, p.285). Whilst
innovation has typically been seen to occur within the boundaries of an organization, the
manner in which many organizations innovate has changed as it has moved from a closed to
an open process (Bigliardi et al., 2010; Chesbrough, 2003). Through inter-firm innovations,
organizations actively cooperate with external actors to compensate for their scarce internal
resources and limited competencies (Lichtenthaler, 2008; Baum et al., 2000).
But inter-firm collaborations expose firms to risks of appropriation and performance (Rosell,
2014; Das and Teng, 2001). The reliance on external parties can be problematic because key
areas of expertise of a collaborator may be gradually appropriated by the other partner.
One might also discover that a partner does not have the competency to ensure a successful
innovation outcome. Arguably, inter-firm innovations are generally higher risk projects than
intra-firm innovations and other types of inter-organizational collaborations. They present a
paradox for organizations and scholars: while one wants to actively cooperate to transform
ideas into cutting-edge or better products, services or processes, one also must guard against the
possibility that expertise and competitive advantage may be lost. Crucially, the benefits gained
from engaging in inter-firm innovation projects do not accrue automatically but require
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conscious management action (Mohr and Sengupta, 2004). According to Crossan and Inkpen
(1995), maximizing the value of inter-firm innovation necessitates that organizations put in
place suitable control mechanisms. Controls help minimize appropriation and performance
risks (Miller et al., 2011; Hoecht and Trott, 2006) by creating ample space for both the
‘firmness and flexibility’ required in inter-firm innovations (van der Meer-Kooistra and
Scapens, 2008). They also assist in coordinating interdependent tasks (Rosell, 2014; Dekker,
2004), which are characteristic of inter-firm innovations. Notably, there are few studies that
have investigated the use of controls to manage the dual challenge of cooperation and
coordination in inter-firm collaborative innovation projects (Rosell, 2014). The lack of
research may be reflective of a view in the innovation management literature that formal
management control mechanisms constrain, or at worst are irrelevant to, product
development (e.g. Verona, 1999; Dougherty and Hardy, 1996). However, there has been a
growing acknowledgement that successful innovations require organizational mechanisms
(Bharadwaj and Menon, 2000). There are scholars like Hansen and Jönsson (2005), and,
Davila (2000) who propose that formal control mechanisms could enable innovation.
Mouritsen et al. (2009) for instance, suggest that these control mechanisms encourage and
ensure that innovation projects are aligned with the strategic intent of organizations.
This study draws from the theory of transaction cost economics to begin to identify that the
project characteristics of asset specificity, uncertainty and complexity are highly relevant in
helping understand how to manage appropriation and performance risks in inter-firm
innovations (see Williamson, 1985). This study also adopts a contingency-based framework
to propose links between these characteristics, on the one hand, and the use of controls in,
and, performance of inter-firm projects, on the other hand. A contingency framework
implicates contextual variables in the design of effective controls and performance. This
framework can be traced to the original structural contingency frameworks developed within
3

organizational theory (Chenhall, 2006). According to Chenhall (2006, p.164), theorists such
as Burns and Stalker (1961), Perrow (1970), Thompson (1967), Lawrence & Lorsch (1967)
and Galbraith (1973) focused on the impact of environment and technology on organizational
structure. Early accounting researchers then drew on this work to investigate the importance
of environment, technology, structure and size to the design of management control systems.
This study adopts this approach to link risk factors with management control mechanisms and
project performance.
This study seeks to address areas which have received minimal attention so far, including firstly
how risk factors influence the use of controls in, and, performance of inter-firm innovation
projects (McCarthy and Gordon, 2011; Dekker, 2004). The second gap is identified by Ding
and colleagues (2013) who observed there are only a few studies that examine the link
between management controls and inter-firm collaboration performance. Finally, this study
seeks to address the equivocal position in the literature on the individual effects of two
types of management controls namely, formal and social controls, on innovation
performance (Bisbe and Otley, 2004).
This study thus has two aims. The first aim is to examine the impact of i n t e r - f i r m
i n n o v a t i o n project risks, operationalized as asset specificity, uncertainty and complexity,
on the use of formal and social controls in, and the performance of, inter-firm innovation
projects. The second aim is to assess the influence of formal and social controls on
innovation project performance. The study contributes to the literature on the management of
inter-firm innovation projects in two ways. Firstly, it fosters a deep understanding of the link
between innovation project characteristics which indicate risks, on the one hand, and the use
of controls and inter-firm innovation project performance, on the other hand (Davila et al.,
2009). According to Gasmann (2006), the opening up of the innovation process requires
adaptation of management systems. The focus on inter-firm innovation at a project level
4

instead of at an organizational level is salient because of the temporal nature of projects.
Projects are claimed to require more interpersonal and less formal processes of coordination
(Janowicz-Panjaitan et al., 2009). Interestingly, the same view on the use of controls in
temporal projects can be applied to the management of innovation risks, where it is argued
that the use of formal controls is less suitable but more amenable to the use of social controls
(Hoecht and Trott, 2006). Secondly, the study tests an under investigated postulate that the
use of management controls contribute to better performance of inter-firm collaborations
(Dekker et al., 2013; Ding et al., 2013). Thus, the study also explores consequences of the
use of inter-firm innovation controls on performance.
The remainder of the paper has 4 sections. Section 2 presents the literature review and
hypotheses development. Sections 3 and 4 provide the research method and findings. Section
5 concludes with a discussion of the implications of the findings, limitations of the study and
areas for further research.
2.

Literature review and hypotheses development

2.1 Project characteristics of asset specificity, uncertainty and complexity,
and, project performance
This study draws on the theory of transaction cost economics (TCE) to highlight the risks
that inter-firm innovation projects have. TCE focuses on the potential downsides of
cooperation while the resource-based view of the firm emphasizes the upside of cooperation
(Finch et al., 2015). Crucially, TCE adopts a passive risk management perspective with a
focus on pre-calculation of risk arising from partners’ opportunistic behaviours and bounded
rationality (Anderson and Dekker, 2009). In so doing, it allows a considered response to the
question of how organizations could manage the paradox of inter-firm innovations.
Drawing from TCE and studies that have adopted TCE and contingency theory, this study
5

identified three project properties namely asset specificity, uncertainty and complexity of
transactions as potentially helping explain the appropriation and performance risks of interfirm innovation projects (Dekker, 2004; Williamson, 1985). It is worth noting that while
TCE lists asset specificity and uncertainty, it also includes the factor of frequency. The
innovation literature, however, characterizes the innovation process with uncertainty and
complexity (Triguero and Córcoles, 2013). Moreover, the definitions and operationalization
of the construct of uncertainty in the accounting and innovation literatures are not identical
and overlap with those of frequency, as defined by TCE, and, complexity. In the accounting
literature uncertainty is linked to the environment and technology (Ditillo, 2004). Various
authors then include and place differing emphases on elements of dynamism,
heterogeneity, predictability and controllability in regard to environmental uncertainty, and,
on task uncertainty, complexity and interdependence when referring to the degree of
technological uncertainty. In the innovation literature a common definition of complexity
is in the anthropological sense of increasing differentiation and specialization in structure
combined with increasing integration of parts (Tainter, 1988). In light of the overlaps and
varied emphases in definitions, this study examines the factors of asset specificity and
uncertainty as operationalized and used in the accounting literature (and drawing from
TCE), and complexity as generally understood in the innovation literature (noting
definitional overlaps with TCE). Particularly on uncertainty, it is the element of
predictability of the environment which is the interest of the study.
Asset specificity relates to the dedicated investments in inter-firm innovation projects. As
noted by Langfield-Smith (2008, p.346) who referred to the work by Williamson (1991) and
Nooteboom (2004), asset specificity can take several forms: site or location specificity,
physical assets specificity, human assets specificity (training, knowledge), brand name
or reputational capital, and dedicated capacity. A high degree of asset specificity signifies
6

little alternative use of these investments outside the project resulting in a high level of
bilateral dependency between parties (David and Han, 2004). It also results in a heightened
level of appropriation risk by the partner, which could then severely impact on the
performance of innovation projects (Dekker, 2004). Appropriation risk is explained by TCE
as emanating from opportunistic partners who will pursue their self-interests.
A high level of uncertainty translates into a low level of predictability of the market and
customer technical requirements of inter-firm innovation projects. Higher uncertainty
implies that inter-firm innovation teams will find it more difficult to design a product,
service or process that will satisfy market requirements. In addition to being self-interested
and opportunistic, TCE also depicts human beings as having bounded rationality. Economic
decision-making whilst intentionally rational is limited by “experience cognitive
constraints”, which include limited information, lack of knowledge and informationprocessing capabilities (Vosselman & van der Meer-Kooistra, 2006). The higher level of
unpredictability and the limited ability of partners to effectively deal with it, reduces the
likelihood that the innovation project will succeed in the market or in its implementation in
an organization resulting in poorer project outcomes (Tatikonda and Rosenthal, 2000), that
is, performance risk.
Complexity is explained in terms of novelty of the technology (Carbonell and
Rodriguez, 2006), the number and level of skills required, and the extent of integration
and interaction involved with the skills and functions (Chapman and Hyland, 2004).
Practitioners describe an innovation project as having a high level of technology risk when,
at the beginning of the project, they do not fully understand the technology, hence do not
know the exact means to accomplish the project (Tatikonda and Rosenthal, 2000). This is
expected using TCE as a framework because human actors are assumed to have bounded
rationality. Hence the newness of technology conflates task uncertainty resulting in a high
7

probability of negative task outcomes. But Tatikonda and Rosenthal (2000) found that that
use of higher levels of new technology actually results in greater achievement of the
innovation performance objectives. They attribute this finding, in regard to new product
developments, to firms often under anticipating the technical performance capabilities of
new technology employed to develop a new product. As for other factors impacting on
complexity, the extent of integration and interaction involved with the skills and
functions are also depicted as contributing to task uncertainty resulting in unsatisfactory
project outcomes, in particular development times or time-to-market (Griffin, 1997; Meyer
and Utterback, 1995). Hence overall we propose the following set of hypotheses:
H1a. Asset specificity is negatively associated with the performance of inter-firm innovation
projects.
H1b. Uncertainty is negatively associated with the performance of inter-firm innovation
projects.
H1c. Complexity is negatively associated with the performance of inter-firm innovation
projects.
2.2 Project characteristics of asset specificity, uncertainty and complexity, and, the use of
formal and social controls
Researchers seem to accept that innovation is a phenomenon that can be subjected to human
control perhaps because it is considerably affected by human interaction (Hoecht and Trott,
2006). The discussion in this section takes both a TCE and a contingency approach to link the
project characteristics of asset specificity, uncertainty and complexity with the use of
management control mechanisms. Management controls are said to minimize innovation
risks (Han et al., 2008) and are important in maintaining and developing inter-firm
collaboration (Kang et al., 2014). They are designed to assist collaborating organizations to
regulate themselves (Otley et al., 1995) in uncertain settings (Gordon and Narayanan, 1984).
Indeed Simons (1987) found that organizations that pursued innovation and growth
significantly used various control systems than those that did not. Henri (2006) and
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Bisbe and Otley (2004) thereafter demonstrated that the interactive use of formal
controls impacted on organizational capabilities to innovate and on organizational
performance.
Management control systems are defined as a set of different procedures and processes
to ensure achievement of management and organizational goals (Otley and Berry, 1994).
These systems provide information which can be used for decision making, planning,
controlling and evaluation (Merchant and Otley, 2007). Controls have been categorized
as formal and informal controls (Kirsch, 1997; Anthony et al., 1989); output and behavior
controls (Ouchi, 1977); market, bureaucracy and clan controls

(Ouchi,

1979);

administrative and social controls (Hopwood, 1976), and results, action and personnel
controls (Merchant, 1985). In this study controls are categorized as formal and social
controls, a classification used in studies of Australian inter- firm collaborations, a context
shared h e r e (Giacobbe and Booth, 2009; Langfield-Smith, 2008; Mahama, 2006). Formal
controls specify contractual obligations and explicitly designed organizational mechanisms
to manage inter-firm collaboration (Dekker, 2004; Langfield-Smith and Smith, 2003).
They help organizations and their members focus on final outcomes and prescribe the
appropriate behavior to achieve these outcomes (Vélez et al., 2008; Dekker, 2004; Das and
Teng, 2001). Social controls cover informal cultures and systems, communication,
socialization and self-regulation (Mahama, 2006; Dekker, 2004). They assist in increasing
relationship commitment, reducing goal incongruence and establishing a compatible set of
values between collaborating partners (Mahama, 2006; Das and Teng, 2001). According to
relationship marketing theory, there should be facilitative mechanisms to help collaborators
develop a competence in managing inter-organizational relationships. Simonin (1997), for
instance, states that learning how to collaborate assists in successful relationships. In this
study, the use of social controls provides a means for partners to engender a commitment to
9

the relationship, which then results in the collaborators increasing the likelihood of positive
project outcomes.
As indicated earlier, a high degree of asset specificity signifies little alternative use of
resources beyond the project leading to parties being highly dependent on each other (David
and Han, 2004). This scenario exemplifies the inter-firm innovation paradox for organizations
and scholars. The use of resources including human assets (training, knowledge) solely for
an inter-firm innovation project is equated with a situation where a party will be
accorded exclusive access to the other party’s highly specialized expertise thereby
potentially fulfilling an aim of inter-collaborative projects of gaining new or better
expertise. However, according to TCE, this exclusive access to highly specialized resources
also creates appropriation risk.
The potential risk triggers a safeguarding of investments through controls. According to
TCE, the bounded rationality of partners results in incomplete contracts and formal
controls. So while formal controls may be useful, on their own they are insufficient to
mitigate appropriation risk. Hence, social controls must be used in conjunction with
formal controls to allow further monitoring and curbing of the partner’s potential
opportunistic behavior arising from a high degree of asset specificity (Gulati and Singh,
1998). In addition the role of social controls in encouraging a commitment to the
relationship means that efforts will be expended to achieve project outcomes.
Uncertainty also presents a challenge for rational decision-making. Further, unpredictability
of market and customer technical requirements means that it will be difficult to establish
clear specifications, goals and outcomes (Kang et al., 2014; Dekker, 2004), thus
presumably resulting in reliance on b o t h formal and social controls. Contracts, as earlier
noted, are inherently incomplete not only because of the bounded rationality of contracting
parties but also because of environmental and technological uncertainty. These two factors
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combine to create contracts that cannot pre-specify every future contingency. Arguably,
innovations, which require adapting to m a n y unforeseen opportunities and challenges
(Davila et al., 2009), are imbued with compounded uncertainty. This characteristic of
innovations make the use of contracts useful (Dekker, 2004) but if used solely may be
ineffective in dealing with uncertainty. Van der Meer-Kooistra and Scapens (2015) identify
the need for a social structure to compensate for the limitations of incomplete contracts and
other formal modes of control. A social structure is concerned with the day-to-day activities
of the innovation process and includes team-based structures and regular meetings which
enable collaborating parties to communicate with each other. Information sharing allows
parties to make sense of an unpredictable context (Revilla and Knoppen, 2015). In addition,
Speklé (2001) advises that when confronted with high uncertainty, firms through the use of
social controls, strive to establish a situation of commitment and congruency to achieve
desired outcomes. The push to create commitment from transacting parties is also necessary
to counter their opportunistic and self-interested tendencies. Thus overall, in conditions of
high uncertainty, successful organizations use a combination of formal and social controls
(Chenhall and Morris, 1995).
In a comprehensive review of literature on management control systems in innovation
companies, Haustein et al. (2014) deduce that in conditions of a high level of complexity, it
will become very difficult to express the outcome of transformation processes in numbers.
An impersonal mode of coordination by rules, procedures, plans and schedules may be
challenging to implement (Abernethy and Brownell, 1997; Chapman, 1997; Van de Ven et
al., 1976). Indeed, Van de Ven et al. (1976) propose that more personal and group- based
modes of coordination will also be required. Despite their opportunistic leanings, employees
need to be fully committed to their specific roles (Wilkins and Ouchi, 1983), and, social
controls that focus on communication and participative decision-making enhance
11

opportunities for creativity and the free flow of ideas particularly because there is a variety of
skills and functions involved (Burns and Stalker, 1961). Social controls resulting in effective
communication also allows the sharing of domain specific knowledge (e.g., knowledge about
technology) (Rundquist, 2012).
Indeed Dekker (2004) drawing from Borys and Jemison (1989), does not think that
organizations should choose between formal or social controls. Instead he proposes that a
higher level of interdependence requires more sophisticated coordination mechanisms than
that of a set of a low level of formal controls and a high level of social controls. In Dekker’s
case, interdependence is a function of the number of skills required, and the extent of
integration and interaction involved with the skills and functions. His findings resonate in
this study because these elements partly determine the level of complexity of innovation
projects. He finds in his research that a combination of formal and informal control
mechanisms was mobilised. The former included budgeting and performance evaluation and
measurement, and, the latter involved joint interaction and problem solving, and,
communication. Hence we propose the following set of hypotheses:
H2a. Asset specificity is positively associated with the use of formal controls in inter-firm
innovation projects.
H2b. Asset specificity is positively associated with the use of social controls in inter-firm
innovation projects.
H2c. Uncertainty is positively associated with the use of formal controls in inter- firm
innovation projects.
H2d. Uncertainty is positively associated with the use of social controls in inter- firm
innovation projects.
H2e. Complexity is positively associated with the use of formal controls in inter-firm
innovation projects.
H2f. Complexity is positively associated with the use of social controls in inter-firm
innovation projects.
2.3 The use of formal and social controls, and, performance
12

Formal controls help ensure that innovative ideas are translated into effective innovations
and enhance performance (Chenhall and Morris, 1995). However, they are also viewed as
incompatible with innovation because they can deter creativity and may not be able
to adequately cope with the uncertainty inherent in innovations (Amabile, 1998). But
formal controls do coexist with innovation (Ezzamel, 1990). Notably, the most innovative
firms are intensive users of formal controls (Simons, 1995). In regard to social controls,
Hoecht and Trott (2006) posit that they are more effective than formal controls in
managing innovation risks. The social interconnectedness in inter-firm innovation
relationships (Baraldi and Strőmsten, 2009) highlights the primacy of people in
innovation success and therefore the need for more communication to cultivate
commitment (Soutar and McNeil, 1993), helping improve innovation performance
(Rundquist, 2012). Thus overall, different types of controls perform specific roles in
helping attain success in inter-firm innovation (Davila, 2005). Hence, the use of a
combination of controls is proposed as being more effective in achieving innovation goals
than the use of a single type of control (Chen et al., 2009). In the case of intra-firm
innovations, Bisbe and Malagueño (2009) make a similar observation that an
organization’s ability to either curb innovation excesses or encourage innovativeness may
depend on the activation of diverse forms of control, to create a complementary fit.
Therefore the following set of hypotheses is proposed:
H3a. The use of formal controls is positively associated with the performance of inter-firm
innovation projects.
H3b. The use of social controls is positively associated with the performance of inter-firm
innovation projects.
2.4 The mediating effect of formal and social controls
The set of hypotheses from H2a to H2f suggests a direct link between asset specificity,
uncertainty and complexity, on the one hand and the use of formal and social controls, on the
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other hand. H3a and H3b also predict a positive link between the use of formal and social and
inter-firm innovation projects performance. Hence overall these hypotheses suggest a
mediating role for the use of formal and social controls in the proposed link between the
characteristics and performance of inter-firm innovation projects as captured in the first set of
hypotheses (H1a – H1c). Therefore, collectively the following hypotheses are proposed:
H4a. The relationship between asset specificity and the performance of inter-firm
innovation projects is mediated by the use of formal controls.
H4b. The relationship between uncertainty and the performance of inter-firm innovation
projects is mediated by the use of formal controls.
H4c. The relationship between complexity and the performance of inter-firm innovation
projects is mediated by the use of formal controls.
H4d. The relationship between asset specificity and the performance of inter-firm innovation
projects is mediated by the use of social controls.
H4e. The relationship between uncertainty and the performance of inter-firm innovation
projects is mediated by the use of social controls.
H4f. The relationship between complexity and the performance of inter-firm innovation
projects is mediated by the use of social controls.

The conceptual model is presented in Figure I below:

[Insert Figure 1 here]

3.

Research method

Data were collected through a self-administrated paper-based survey from a sample of
senior managers who acted as primary liaison officers for organizations engaged in interfirm innovations. The targeted organizations were randomly selected from large
companies1 in OneSource database from the wholesale trade, retail trade, information

1

A large company is defined as one that meets at least one of three criteria: (1) having revenue for the financial
year that is $25 million or more; (2) having gross assets with a value of $12.5 million or more of at the end of
the financial year; (3) having 50 or more employees at the end of the financial year.
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media and telecommunications, professional, scientific and technical services and
manufacturing industries. More than 45.2% of businesses in these industries were
reported as innovation–active businesses in the 2010-11 Innovation in Australian
Business Survey (IABS) (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2013). To ensure that we sent
the questionnaires to relevant organizations and knowledgeable staff and therefore improve
the quality of responses, telephonic recruitment was undertaken to identify potential
survey respondents. The final sample of survey participants met the criteria of their
organizations having been involved in at least one inter-firm innovation in the last three
years, of being the knowledgeable staff, and, expressing interest in participating in the
study. As a result, 317 questionnaires were distributed and 75 valid responses were
received. Thus, the final response rate is 24%.
As reported in Table 1, 66% of the respondents were members of top management,
including CEOs, CFOs and directors, and 31% were functional managers, such as
general managers and operations managers. Majority (65%) of the respondents had
worked with the organization for more than 10 years.
[Insert Table 1 here]

3.1 Instrument design
To fine-tune the instrument, a pilot test was conducted with three expert academics
resulting in minor modifications to the survey instrument.2 All items on the constructs of
asset specificity, uncertainty and complexity were measured using a seven-point Likert scale
ranging from 1 = very low to 7 = very high. For measurement of formal and social controls,
the respondents were asked to rate their use of these controls on a seven-point Likert scale
with 1 = never used to 7 = often used. Innovation performance was also measured on a
2

The survey instrument is available upon request from the corresponding author.
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seven-point Likert scale ranging from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree. A
summary of all variables descriptions is provided in an Appendix.
Asset specificity was measured using six items which were adapted and modified based
on Dekker (2008), Geyskens et al. (2006), and Heide and John (1990).3 The respondents
were asked to rate the degree in which human capital (e.g. training, knowledge), brand
name, equipment and other physical assets, site or facilities, tailored procedures and routines
can be redeployed outside a particular innovation. If the possibility of redeployment is high,
there is low asset specificity. Consistent with extant literature, the measurement items
consists of human assets specificity (training, knowledge), brand name or reputational
capital, physical assets specificity, site or location specificity, and dedicated capacity
(Langfield-Smith, 2008). They all relate to transaction-specific assets used for an innovation
project (Geyskens et al., 2006). All the items are well above the cut-off of 0.50 suggested by
Bisbe and Otley (2004) and one factor solution can explain 59.23% of common variance for
this construct.
Uncertainty is defined as the inability of the firm to accurately forecast the external
environment, technical requirements, and market and industry changes in the context of a
particular

inter-firm

innovation, which

captures

the

elements

of environmental,

technological and behavioral uncertainties suggested by Geyskens et al. (2006). There
were seven items, which were adapted and modified from Dekker (2008), Geyskens et al.
(2006), and Heide and John (1990). All seven items loaded well on one factor and
explained 64% of common variance for uncertainty.
Complexity measures the degree of the newness of the technology (technological

3

One global indicator was also used for all reflective constructs to test the correlation of individual items to this
global item. The results showed high levels of correlation between individual and global items. The global items
were excluded during the structural model analysis.
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complexity), the number and level of skills or functions required, the extent of
interactions among different skills or functions (organizational complexity), and the extent
of integration required (development complexity). There were seven items adapted from
Dekker (2008), and, Kim and Wilemon (2003). Factor analysis revealed that all items
loaded on a single factor with 66.75% common variance explained.
The use of formal and social controls was measured as two formative constructs, as
these two variables consist of different “inherent constitutive facets” (Bisbe et al., 2007) of
control mechanisms. Most of the indicators used to measure these two constructs were
based on Giacobbe and Booth (2009), Kamminga and van der Meer-Kooistra (2007), and
Chalos and O’Connor (2004). Formal controls consist of contracts, planning and budgeting,
standardised procedures and rules, formal project methodology (e.g. PRINCE2,
PIMBOK, AGILE, SCRUM), performance evaluation and management reports. Social
controls include networking and other socialization processes, teams and taskforces, rituals,
traditions

and

ceremonies,

organizational

culture/values

alignment,

face-to-face

communication and participatory decision-making. The respondents were asked to
indicate the extent to which these control mechanisms were used by their organizations
to manage a particular inter-firm innovation project.
Inter-firm innovation project performance captures the degree to which the goals were
achieved, articulated as: achieving the primary objective, enhancing the organization’s
competitive position, learning some critical skill(s) or capabilities, and exhibiting higher
innovation performance compared to competitors. Five items were adapted from Walter et
al. (2008). 72.966% of common variance was explained by a one factor construct.

3.2 Control variables
To improve the explanatory power of the proposed path models, a number of variables
17

were controlled for the analysis, including sector of the company, size of the company,
innovation types4, stage of inter-firm innovation, ownership of inter-firm relationship,
a n d , prior experience5 with this partner (Chiesa et al., 2009; Davila et al., 2009;
Dekker, 2008; Luo, 2008) (see Table II). These control variables were used during data
analysis as moderating variables for the structural models.

[Insert Table 2 here]

3.3 Tests for potential biases
To test for non-response bias, late responses were compared with early responses by using
t-tests on all the measurements. No significant differences were found, thus, nonresponse bias does not appear to be a concern in the study. To test for the potential of
social desirability bias, Shapiro-Wilk tests of normality were conducted. The results
indicated normal distributions and considerable variances in responses for the variables of
interest. To minimise the likelihood that the respondents provided socially desirable
answers to the questions, information about anonymity was provided in the cover letter and
questionnaire. Thus, reasonable steps and tests were undertaken to minimize and detect
social desirability bias from the respondents. Potential common method bias seems also
not a concern based on Harman’s (1967) single-factor test with results showing that no
single factor explains the majority of variance (Dowling, 2009).
4. Results
Data analysis was conducted by using the structural equation modelling (SEM) with
the Partial Least Square (PLS) technique (Chin, 1998), which is a component-based SEM
4

Three questions collected information on the nature of innovation and the degree of inter-firm innovation.
We use the stage of innovation as a proxy of the duration of inter-firm relationship and prior experience as an
indicator of relationship closeness.
5
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technique for analysis of research models with both reflective and formative constructs
(Gefen and Straub, 2005). The software SmartPLS Version 3.0 was used (Ringle et al.,
2015).
4.1 Measurement models
Reflective constructs were tested for internal consistency reliability, convergent and
discriminant validities. As illustrated in Table III, both Cronbach alpha and composite
reliability scores are above the 0.70 suggested benchmark for internal consistency of a
reflective construct (Chin, 1998). To assess convergent validity, confirmatory factor
analysis (CFA) was performed by PLS (Davis et al., 2014). Factor loadings for all
retained items are well above the cut-off of 0.50 and all significant on the intended
construct (p < 0.001). In addition, average variance extracted (AVE) for these constructs
exceed the suggested value of 0.50, which also suggests a high level of convergent
reliability (Chin, 1998). Discriminant validity of reflective constructs was assessed based
on factor cross-loading and the square root of the AVE statistics. As shown in Tables IV
and V, all items loaded higher on their own construct than other constructs both
horizontally and vertically, and each construct shares more variance with its own items
than other constructs, i ndicating an acceptable degree of discriminant validity (Davis et al.,
2014, Lau and Roopnarain, 2014; Chin, 1998).

[Insert Tables 3, 4 and 5 here]

As the use of formal and social controls was measured as formative constructs,
common construct validity tests cannot be applied (Petter et al., 2007). As recommended
by Petter et al. (2007), indicators weights were examined though principal component
analysis. All of the formative indicators have significant weights at p < 0.001 level. To
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assess the potential problem of multicollinearity, variance inflation factor (VIF) analysis
was conducted in SPSS 20 by regressing each indicator on the other indicators of
formative constructs (Davis et al., 2014). The results show all VIF scores are below the
cut-off value of 3.3, which means that multicollinearity is not a problem with the formative
constructs (Davis et al., 2014; Petter et al., 2007).
4.2 Structural models
The structural models were tested by bootstrapping techniques with 1,000 samples
replacement (Hartmann and Slapničar, 2009). As presented in Figures 2, R2 values for the
use of formal controls, the use of social controls and inter-firm innovation performance
range from 0.356 to 0.530, which indicate sufficient explanatory power (Chin, 1998).
As shown in Figure 2, the results show that there is no significant association between asset
specificity and innovation performance (H1a), however significant negative association (p <
0.01) exists between uncertainty and innovation performance (H1b), and, significant positive
association (p < 0.001) is identified between the level of complexity and innovation
performance (H1c). Hence, this study provides evidence to support H1b and evidence for an
opposite positive relationship to H1c. The results also reveal that the paths between asset
specificity and the use of formal and social controls are insignificant. Hence, H2a and
H2d are not supported. There was also no significant association found between
uncertainty and the use of formal controls (H2b). The path between uncertainty and the
use of social controls, however, is significant (p < 0.05), but the co-efficient is -0.170,
which suggests a negative association between the level of uncertainty and the use of social
controls. Thus, H2c is also not supported but results suggest an opposite negative
association. The paths between complexity on the one hand and the use of formal controls
(p < 0.001), and, social controls (p < 0.01), on the other hand, are both statistically
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significant. H2c and H2f are therefore supported. The results also show strong positive
associations between the use of both formal and social controls and inter-firm
innovation performance (p < 0.01, p < 0.001), providing evidence to support H3a and
H3b.
[Insert Figure 2 here]

H4a-H4f predict that the use of formal controls and social controls mediates the relationships
between asset specificity, uncertainty and complexity on one hand, and the performance of
inter-firm innovation on the other hand. Additional tests were performed to examine potential
mediation effects following Baron and Kenny (1986). Two submodels are analyzed using the
use of formal and social controls as mediators. As shown in Figure 2, the direct model, using
transaction characteristics (asset specificity, uncertainty and complexity) as independent
variables and inter-firm innovation project performance as dependent variable, reveals that
uncertainty is negatively associated with innovation performance (β = -0.352, t = 3.110, p <
0.01) and complexity is positively associated with innovation performance (β = 0.380, t =
3.481, p < 0.001). When the use of formal controls is added as mediator, Table 6 shows that
the direct path coefficients for both uncertainty and complexity to performance are still
significant (β = 0.319, t = 2.314, p < 0.05; β = 0.257, t = 2.065, p < 0.05). Following Baron
and Kenny (1986), the results suggest partial mediations only for the use of formal controls.
This is observed because the relationships between both uncertainty and complexity to
performance remain significant after the use of formal controls is introduced as a mediator in
these relationships. The meaningfulness of these partial mediations are assessed by
decomposing the total effects into direct and indirect effects in Table 6. The indirect effect of
uncertainty on performance is only 0.032, which is below the meaningful threshold of 0.05
suggested by Bartol (1983, p.809), however, the indirect effect of complexity of 0.096 is
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above the 0.05 meaningful benchmark. Thus, the overall results suggest that the positive
relationship between complexity and innovation performance is partly due to the use of
formal controls. Notably, the direct negative association between uncertainty and innovation
performance becomes significantly positive after taking into account the use of formal
controls. This result suggests that the use of formal controls may play a vital role in reducing
uncertainty in inter-firm innovation projects, which could then lead to better innovation
performance.
A similar analysis is also conducted for the use of social controls as a mediator on the
relationships between the project characteristics and innovation performance. The results
indicate a partial mediation of the use of social controls in the relationship between
complexity and performance, with an indirect effect of 0.058, which is above the meaningful
threshold of 0.05. Hence, the total effect on complexity on innovation performance consists
of a direct effect (β = 0.312, t = 2.621, p < 0.01) and an indirect effect through the use of both
formal and social controls. Therefore, only H4b, H4c and H4f are supported. The insight
gained in the use of formal controls impacting on the negative relationship between
uncertainty and performance is noteworthy.
[Insert Table 6 here]

Tests on the moderating effects of control variables on the structural models revealed that
inbound innovation projects (p < 0.05, ß = 0.193) and innovation projects at the stage of
commercialisation and value capture (p < 0.10, ß = 0.190) are significantly related to higher
innovation performance. The findings also suggest that innovation projects with more equity
ownership tend to use more formal controls (p < 0.10, ß = 0.213). No significant differences
in terms of the results were found for the other control variables.
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5. Discussion and conclusion
This study aimed to examine the direct effects of: 1) asset specificity, uncertainty and
complexity on the performance of inter-firm innovation projects, and, the use of formal and
social controls, and, 2) the use of formal and social controls on the performance of interfirm innovation projects. The indirect (mediating) effects of the use of formal and social
controls on the proposed relationships of asset specificity, uncertainty and complexity with
the performance of inter-firm innovation projects were also investigated.
The project characteristics of asset specificity, uncertainty and complexity were
hypothesized as negatively impacting on inter-firm innovation project performance because
of the appropriation and performance risks that they engendered on performance. Our study
produced interesting results. Asset specificity was not associated with inter-firm innovation
project performance. This finding is contradictory to expectations drawn from transaction
cost economics theory. We explain this result by questioning the relevance of the construct
of asset specificity at the level of granularity of inter-firm innovation projects. Firstly, whilst
asset specificity is relevant at an organizational level resulting in organizational mechanisms
to minimize appropriation risks, we propose that at the level of projects, it may not be a
foremost concern of team members. Secondly, innovation is about experimentation and
creativity, suggesting that knowledge that is used to generate innovation may not necessarily
be dedicated to, and, restricted in its use for, an innovation project. Indeed a project could
benefit from seemingly disparate human capitals, being brought together and reconfigured to
produce innovative solutions to problems. Innovation results in new knowledge, an output
which is embodied in a new product or process. The notion of asset specificity, however, is
of assets as inputs to an innovation project, which have to be safeguarded. As anticipated,
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uncertainty had a negative association with performance. We interpret this to mean that
changes in market/customer requirements could result in innovation project outcomes like a
new product or service, or process, becoming irrelevant when the product/service is released
to the market, or the process is implemented in an organization. Contrary to our prediction,
complexity was positively associated with project performance. In our study, complexity
was operationalized as the degree of newness of technology, the level and number of skills,
degree of integration and difficulty in assessing development requirements. Our findings are
consistent with that of Tatikonda and Rosenthal (2000), where the use of higher levels of
new technology results in greater achievement of the innovation performance objectives.
Our study also found evidence to indicate that the use of higher levels of skills will generate
better innovation outcomes.
The study also found that asset specificity did not impact on the use of formal and social
controls. It is plausible that the human capitals and physical assets used for inter-firm
innovation projects are shared across many projects. Hence, controls to safeguard these assets
are influenced by factors at a firm/aggregate-level instead of those at project level. In other
words, the use of shared assets will not have a bearing on the use of specific formal and
social controls for the project. Uncertainty impacted on the use of social controls but not
on formal controls. In the context of inter-firm innovation projects, it seems that high
levels of unpredictability make it very difficult to establish clear specifications, goals and
outcomes, which form the basis of the use of formal controls. Hence this study finds some
support for Kang et al. (2014) where it was argued that there may be less emphasis on the
use of formal controls to manage uncertainty. Notably, we found a contra hypothesis (H2d)
negative association between uncertainty and the use of social controls at the level of
innovation projects. Whilst the use of social controls facilitate information sharing to enable
parties to make sense of an unpredictable context (Revilla and Knoppen, 2015), it seems that
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in regard to innovation projects, an unpredictable context discourages the use of social
controls. We surmise that project teams in our study do not see the value in using social
controls to mitigate risks associated with uncertain markets. It is plausible also that whilst
relevant for project outcomes, controls may be activated at the organizational level instead
to manage negative risks resulting from uncertainty, say by clarifying customer
requirements, engaging in further market assessments and the like.
In regard to complexity, the study’s results suggest that whilst higher levels of integration and
difficulty in assessing development requirements present challenges to positive outcomes,
these challenges may be managed and mitigated through the use of both formal and social
controls. Our sampled organizations activated both impersonal modes of coordination by
rules, procedures, plans and schedules, and more personal and group-based modes of
coordination which supports the study by Van de Ven et al. (1976). This finding also
supports Dekker (2004) who proposed that a set of sophisticated coordination mechanisms of
both formal and social controls should be mobilized. The use of social controls seems
particularly relevant in the integration of various skills and assessment of development
requirements. We propose to reconcile our findings of a negative association between
uncertainty and the use of social controls, and a positive association between complexity and
social controls. Whilst managing risks relating to unpredictable market requirements may be
done at an organizational level, these requirements are translated at a project level as project
development requirements and here they are managed by using both formal and social
controls. In regard to social controls, they may be useful in ensuring continued commitment
amongst team members (Soutar and McNeil, 1993) through improved communication
(Rundquist, 2012) in the face of difficulty in assessing development requirements.
This study also found that formal and social controls each helped firms in attaining
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success in inter-firm innovation projects ( Davila, 2005). Inter-firm innovation projects,
indeed requires structures and systems to elevate an exchange of knowledge (Christiansen
et al., 2013). These findings lend support to assertions by Davila (2005) that different types
of controls perform specific roles in helping attain success in inter-firm innovation. The
use of a combination of controls would seem more effective in achieving innovation goals
than the use of a single type of control (Chen et al., 2009), echoing an observation by Bisbe
and Malagueño (2009) that a successful innovation project may depend on the activation of
diverse forms of control, to create a complementary fit (also see Ylinen and Gullkvist, 2014;
Chen et al., 2009).
The tests for indirect (mediating) role of the use of formal and social controls in the
relationships between uncertainty and complexity, and, innovation project performance
provide useful insights. The role of formal controls in mitigating the effect of uncertainty on
performance indicates that there is a role for formal controls in managing the risks that
negatively affect performance. Likewise, the use of both formal and social controls allows
cutting-edge technology which may be unfamiliar to team members to be successfully
integrated into new processes, products and services. The use of these controls also help
facilitate the integration of diverse skill-sets, which are critical to creating innovation. Hence
the paradox in inter-firm collaboration in innovation projects could be partly and potentially
be resolved by the use of formal and social controls at project level.
Our study also found evidence to support a proposition by Davila et al. (2009) which
predicted that the distinct and non-linear stages of the innovation process are salient. In
particular, this study found that innovation projects at the stage of commercialisation and
value capture demonstrated higher performance. This result is unsurprising given that the
elements of uncertainty and complexity impacting on the project would have been most
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likely contained or resolved at this stage of the project. It also indicates that the longer the
relationship between the collaborators the higher the likelihood that innovation projects will
be successful. On could deduce that longer relationships foster an opportunity to learn how
to adapt to and work with a partner resulting in better outcomes. The findings also suggest
that innovation projects with more equity ownership tend to use more formal controls. This
is interpreted to mean that collaborators in inter-firm innovation projects that have a
financial stake in projects tend to resort to the use of formal mechanisms such as contracts
and have a stronger focus on outcomes. Test results for the control variables, however, do
not support Chiesa et al. (2009) which indicated that radical innovation projects require
different practices. In explaining our contradictory findings, it is noteworthy that the
aforementioned authors differentiate radical and incremental innovation based on their
attendant degree of uncertainty and complexity. These elements are already captured in
the constructs of uncertainty and complexity used in this study. Because radical
innovation projects are typically characterized by an elevated level of uncertainty in
their early stage, then our results support Chiesa et al.’s (2009) findings that firms will
resort to the use of social controls. Thus in future research, it may be useful to focus also if
not, on the degrees of uncertainty and complexity in innovation projects rather than the
types and stages of innovation.
Overall, the study contributed to our understanding of how asset specificity, uncertainty and
complexity impact on inter-firm innovation project performance. Earlier in the paper, it was
indicated that risks engendered by high levels of asset specificity, uncertainty and
complexity may be managed at different levels of organizations. At project level, our study
found that uncertainty and complexity were relevant to project outcomes. Consequently, the
use of formal and social controls was dependent on factors that directly impacted and were
subject to some degree of influence by team members. Formal and social controls play
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distinctive roles in managing complexity in these projects. In response to JanowiczPanjaitan and colleagues (2009), this study does not align with their view that inter-firm
innovation projects will necessarily require more interpersonal and less formal processes of
coordination, instead suggesting that they are used complementarily.
The findings of this study, however, are subject to at least three limitations which could
be addressed in future research. The first limitation relates to the biases that
respondents may have had, the size of the sample of respondents and endogeneity of the
constructs. Whilst precautionary steps were made to limit social desirability bias, there is
still the possibility of this bias. Despite encouraging results from tests for common method
bias and the use of single respondents to represent inter-firm projects (see Revilla and
Knoppen, 2015), there could still be this bias in the data. In future responses from dyads will
help redress this issue. The sample size of 75 observations of Australian inter-firm
innovation projects may mean that the study should be replicated in other settings for the
findings to be empirical generalizable. However, the study’s findings may have theoretical
generalizability given the literature on the role of risks in performance and the use of formal
and social controls, and, the role of the use of controls in performance. The cross-sectional
nature of the data means that causal relationships amongst the variables cannot be
supported. To support causal relationships, a future study using the case study or
experimental method, would be useful.
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Appendix
Questionnaire items
Asset specificity (AS)
Degree to which the following investments dedicated to this inter-firm innovation could be
redeployed to other innovation projects or company transactions:
AS1 Human capital (e.g. training, knowledge) (R)*.
AS2 Brand name capital (R)*.
AS3 Equipment and other physical assets (R)*.
AS4 Site or facilities (R)*.
AS5 Tailored procedures and routines (R)*.
AS6 Overall, the degree to which investments dedicated to the inter-firm innovation could be
redeployed is (R)*.
*Items marked (R) are reversed. Overall item is excluded from structural model analysis.

Uncertainty (UNT)
Ability of our company to:
UNT1 Accurately forecast the technical requirements/changes in this innovation (R)*.
UNT2 Verify whether compliance with established agreements will occur in this inter-firm
innovation (R)*.
UNT3 Predict potential cost/benefit ratio for this innovation (R)*.
UNT4 Anticipate competitors’ reactions to this innovation (R)*.
UNT5 Anticipate changes in market needs (R)*.
UNT6 Anticipate other industry changes (e.g. regulatory requirements) (R)*.
UNT7 Overall, the ability of our company to predict the relevant contingencies relating to this interfirm innovation is (R)*.
*Items marked (R) are reversed.

Complexity (CMX)
CMX1 Degree of the newness of the technology.
CMX2 The number of skills or functions involved.
CMX3 The level of skills or functions required.
CMX4 The extent of interactions among the different skills or functions.
CMX5 The extent of integration of different research and development decisions.
CMX6 Difficulty in assessing development process requirements.
CMX7 Overall, the level of complexity of this innovation is.

The extent to which YOUR COMPANY use the following mechanisms in this inter-firm innovation
Formal controls (FC)
FC1 Contracts
FC2 Planning and budgeting
FC3 Standardised procedures and rules.
FC4 Formal project methodology (e.g. PRINCE2, PIMBOK, AGILE, SCRUM).
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FC5 Performance evaluation.
FC6 Structural grouping and departmentalisation.
FC7 Management reports.
Social controls (SC)
SC1 Networking and other socialization processes.
SC2 Teams and taskforces.
SC3 Transfer of managers/lateral movements.
SC4 Rituals, traditions and ceremonies.
SC5 Organisational culture/values alignment.
SC6 Ad-hoc committees.
SC7 Face-to-face communication.
SC8 Participatory decision-making.

Innovation project performance (PER)
The degree to which, at the current stage of this inter-firm innovation:
PER1 Our company has achieved its primary objective(s).
PER2 Our company’s competitive position has been greatly enhanced because of this innovation.
PER3 Our company has been successful in learning some critical technologies, skills or capabilities
from this innovation partner.
PER4 Compared to competitors, our company exhibits a higher level of innovation performance.
PER5 Overall, our company is satisfied with the performance of this inter-firm innovation.
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Position

Working Experience

Gender

Top Management
Functional Management
Other
<3 years
3-10 years
>10 years
Male
Female

Frequency
50
23
2
10
16
49
62
13

Per cent
66
31
3
13
21
65
83
17

Table 1. Profile of respondents.

Sector

Employee

Revenue

Assets

Nature of innovation

Degree of innovation
Stage of innovation

Previous Experience
Ownership

Manufacturing
Information media and telecommunications
Professional, scientific and technical services
Retail trade
Other
Wholesale trade
Up to 50
51-1,000
More than 1,000
Up to $ 1 million
$1-$25 million
More than $25 million
Up to $ 1 million
$1-$12.5 million
More than $12.5 million
Goods and Services Innovation
Organizational/Managerial Processes
Innovation
Operational Processes Innovation
Marketing Methods Innovation
Other
Incremental
Radical
Intelligence gathering
Idea recognition and selection
Execution
Transition to operations
Commercialization and value capture
Other
Yes
No
No equity
Less than 50% equity
50% equity
More than 50% equity

Frequency
32
12
12
9
8
2
11
53
11
2
28
43
5
28
41
30
10

Per cent
42.7
16.0
16.0
12.0
10.7
2.7
14.7
70.7
14.7
2.7
37.3
57.3
6.7
37.3
54.7
40.0
13.3

21
10
4
62
13
5
5
23
15

28.0
13.3
5.3
82.7
17.3
6.7
6.7
30.7
20.0

23

30.7

4
31
43
50
5
5
15

5.3
41.3
57.3
66.7
6.7
6.7
20.0

Table 2. Information relating to the Sample of Inter-firm Innovation Projects.
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Mean

Assets Specificity
AS1
3.01
AS2
4.67
AS3
4.40
AS4
4.41
AS5
3.38
Uncertainty
UNT1
3.53
UNT2
3.12
UNT3
3.32
UNT4
3.78
UNT5
3.38
UNT6
3.69
Complexity
CMX1
4.37
CMX2
4.67
CMX3
4.73
CMX4
4.77
CMX5
4.68
CMX6
4.40
Innovation performance
PER1
4.85
PER2
4.77
PER3
5.17
PER4
4.93

Standard
deviation

Factor
loadings

t-Statistica Cronbach
alpha (α)

0.772
1.48
1.83
1.83
1.90
1.48

0.623
0.599
0.707
0.746
0.573

5.852
6.079
9.031
11.240
6.356

1.35
1.45
1.40
1.47
1.31
1.41

0.730
0.803
0.796
0.728
0.842
0.750

13.225
21.766
16.118
10.303
21.320
11.895

1.51
1.45
1.34
1.18
1.36
1.16

0.804
0.835
0.819
0.799
0.783
0.728

17.972
15.860
12.861
9.932
16.970
10.590

1.45
1.48
1.32
1.53

0.857
0.862
0.811
0.870

23.530
25.201
16.438
26.652

Composite
reliability

Average
variance
extracted
(AVE)

0.839

0.593

0.924

0.635

0.915

0.933

0.665

0.918

0.939

0.755

0.903

a All significant at p < 0.001

Table 3. Factor loadings and reliability test results for reflective constructs.
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AS

UNT

CMX

PER

AS1

0.623

0.389

-0.349

-0.321

AS2

0.599

0.250

-0.221

-0.348

AS3

0.707

0.411

-0.385

-0.374

AS4

0.746

0.473

-0.397

-0.365

AS5

0.573

0.373

-0.186

-0.297

UNT1

0.463

0.730

-0.535

-0.538

UNT2

0.537

0.803

-0.455

-0.561

UNT3

0.430

0.796

-0.438

-0.496

UNT4

0.482

0.728

-0.435

-0.479

UNT5

0.507

0.842

-0.498

-0.509

UNT6

0.329

0.750

-0.294

-0.365

CMX1

-0.384

-0.485

0.804

0.606

CMX2

-0.415

-0.456

0.835

0.528

CMX3

-0.366

-0.500

0.819

0.467

CMX4

-0.338

-0.452

0.799

0.522

CMX5

-0.372

-0.460

0.783

0.501

CMX6

-0.398

-0.315

0.728

0.389

PER1

-0.469

-0.503

0.496

0.857

PER2

-0.515

-0.611

0.640

0.862

PER3

-0.407

-0.508

0.543

0.811

PER4

-0.390

-0.518

0.529

0.870

AS = assets specificity, UNT = uncertainty, CMX = complexity, PER = innovation
performance.

Table 4. Discriminant validity test – cross factor loadings.

AS

UNT

AS

0.690

UNT

0.599

0.797

CMX

0.558

0.558

CMX

PER

0.815

PER
0.638
0.636
0.636
0.869
AS = asset specificity, UNT = uncertainty, CMX = complexity, PER = innovation performance.
Numbers in bold = square roots of AVEs of constructs.

Table 5. Discriminant validity: construct correlations and square root of average variance extracted (AVE).
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Table 6 Standardized Direct, Indirect and Total Effects (H4)
Standardized
Direct Effects

Standardized
Indirect Effects

Standardized
Total Effects

Assets Specificity -Formal Control - Innovation performance
Uncertainty -Formal Control - Innovation performance
Complexity -Formal Control - Innovation performance

0.096 (0.701)
0.319 (2.314*)
0.257 (2.065*)

-0.009 (0.634)
0.032 (0.662)
0.096 (1.255)

0.087 (0.556)
0.351 (2.661**)
0.353 (2.904**)

Assets Specificity - Social Controls- Innovation performance
Uncertainty - Social Controls- Innovation performance
Complexity - Social Controls - Innovation performance

0.062 (0.439)
0.258 (1.777)
0.312 (2.621**)

0.031 (0.474)
0.074 (1.440)
0.058 (0.950)

0.093 (0.624)
0.332 (0.560)
0.371 (2.894**)

Relationships

All values are standardized coefficients with p value in parentheses.
* Significant at p < 0.05 (two-tailed).
** Significant at p < 0.01 (two-tailed).

Control variables:
sector; size; nature,
degree and stage of
innovation; previous
experience;
ownership

Controls
Formal Controls
Social Controls
H3

H2

Characteristics
Asset Specificity

H4

Inter-firm
Innovation
Project
Performance

Uncertainty
Complexity

Performance

H1

Direct relationship
Mediated relationship
Control path

Fig. 1. Conceptual model.
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0.213a

Asset
Specificity

Formal
Controls
R2=0.356

ns

More than
50% equity

0.299**
ns
ns
0.476***

Uncertainty

Innovation
Performance
R2=0.530

-0.352**
ns
0.380***

-0.170*

0.403***

Complexity
0.294**

0.190a

Social
Controls
R2=0.424
Commercialisation
and value capture

ns: not significant, * significant at p < 0.05, ** significant at p < 0.01, *** significant at p < 0.001.
a
significance level of p <0.10 (two-tailed test).

Fig. 2. PLS results.

35

References
Abernethy, MA and Brownell, P ( 1997). Management control systems in research and development
organizations: the role of accounting, behavior and personnel controls. Accounting, Organizations and
Society, 22(3/4), 233-248.
Amabile, TM (1998). How to kill creativity. Harvard Business Review, 76(5), 76-87.
Anderson SW and Dekker, HC, (2009). Strategic Cost Management in Supply Chains, Part 1: Structural Cost
Management, Accounting Horizons, 23(2), 201–220.
Anthony, R, J Dearden, and NM Bedford (1989). Management Control Systems (6th Edition). Homewood, III:
Irwin.
Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS). (2013). “2010-11 Innovation in Australian Business Survey (IABS)”,
Commonwealth
of
Australia,
Canberra,
<
http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/Latestproducts/8DEB44FC1970F14CCA257A6200136
AB0?opendocument>. accessed on 08 April, 2013.
Baraldi, E a n d Strőmsten, T ( 2009). Controlling and combining resources in networks – from Uppsala to
Stanford, and back again: The case of a biotech innovation. Industrial Marketing Management, 38(5),
541-552.
Baragheh, A, J Rowley and S Sambrook ( 2009). Towards a multidisciplinary definition of innovation.
Management Decision, 47(8), 1323-1339.
Baron, R. M., and Kenny, D. A. (1986). The moderator–mediator variable distinction in social psychological
research: conceptual, strategic, and statistical considerations. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
51(6), 1173–1182.
Bharadwaj, S and Menon, A (2000). Making innovation happen in organizations: individual creativity
mechanisms, organizational creativity mechanisms or both?. Journal of Product Innovation
Management, 17(6), 424– 434.
Bigliardi, B, E Bottani and F Galati ( 2010). Open innovation and supply chain management in food
machinery supply chain: a case study. International Journal of Engineering, Science and Technology,
2(6), 244-255.
Bisbe, J, J Batistafoguet and R Chenhall ( 2007). Defining management accounting constructs: A
methodological note on the risks of conceptual misspecification. Accounting, Organizations and Society,
32(7-8), 789-820.
Bisbe, J and Malagueño, R (2009). The Choice of Interactive Control Systems under Different Innovation
Management Modes. European Accounting Review, 18(2), 371-405.
Bisbe, J and Otley, D (2004). The effects of the interactive use of management control systems on product
innovation. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 29(8), 709–737.
Borys, B and Jemison, DB (1989). Hybrid arrangements as strategic alliances: theoretical issues in organizational
combinations. Academy of Management Review, 14(2), 234-249.
Bouncken, RB and Fredrech, V (2012). Coopetition: Performance Implications and Management Antecedents.
International Journal of Innovation Management, 16(5), 1250028-1 – 1250028-28.
Burns, T and Stalker, G (1961). The Management of Innovation. Tavistock.
Carbonell, P and Rodriguez, AI ( 2006). Designing teams for speedy product development: the moderating
effect of techonology complexity. Journal of Business Research, 59(2), 225-232.
Chalos, P and O’Connor, NG (2004). Determinants of the use of various control mechanisms in US-Chinese
joint ventures. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 29(7), 591-608.
Chapman, CS (1997). Reflections on a contingent view of accounting. Accounting, Organizations and Society,
22(2), 189-205.
Chapman, R and Hyland, P (2004). Complexity and learning behaviors in product innovation. Technovation,
24(7), 553-561.
Chen, D, S Park, and W Newburry ( 2009). Parent contribution and organizational control in international
joint ventures. Strategic Management Journal, 30(11), 1133-1156.
Chenhall, RH (2006). Theorizing Contingencies in Management Control Systems Research, In CS Chapman, AG
Hopwood and MD Shields (Eds.) Handbook of Management Accounting Research. Elsevier.
Chenhall, RH and Morris, D (1995). Organic decision and communication processes and management
accounting systems in entrepreneurial and conservative business organizations. Omega, 23(5), 485-497.

36

Chesbrough, H ( 2003). Open innovation – The new imperative for creating and profiting from
technology.Harvard Business School Press, Boston (MA).
Chiesa, V, F Frattini, L Lamerti and G Noci (2009). Exploring management control in radical innovation
projects. European Journal of Innovation Management, 12(4), 416-443.
Chin, WW (1998). Issues and opinion on structural equation modeling. MIS Quarterly, 22(1), 7-16.
Christiansen, JK, M Gasparin, and CJ Varnes (2013). Improving Design with Open Innovation: A Flexible
Management Technology. Research - Technology Management, 56(2), 36-44.
Crossan, MM and Inkpen, AC (1995). The subtle art of learning through alliances. Business Quarterly, Winter, 6978.
Das, TK and Teng, B-S ( 2001). Trust, Control, and Risk in Strategic Alliances: An Integrated Framework.
Organization Studies, 22(2), 251-283.
Davila, T (2000). An empirical study on the drivers of management control systems design in new product
development. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 25(4/5), 383-409.
Davila, A ( 2005). An exploratory study on the emergence of management control systems design in new
product development. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 30(3), 223-248.
Davila, A, G Foster, and D Oyon (2009). Accounting and Control, Entrepreneurship and Innovation: Venturing
into New Research Opportunities. European Accounting Review, 18(2), 281–311.
Davis, JM, C Mora-Monge, G Quesada and M G onzalez ( 2014). Cross-cultural influences on e-value
creation in supply chains. Supply Chain Management: An International Journal, 19(2), 187–199.
Dekker, HC ( 2004). Control of inter-organizational relationships: evidence on appropriation concerns and
coordination requirements. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 29(1), 27-49.
Dekker, HC (2008). Partner selection and governance design in inter-firm relationships. Accounting,
Organizations and Society, 33(7-8), 915-941.
Dekker, HC, J Sakaguchi and T Kawai (2013). Beyond the contract: Managing risk in supply chain relations.
Management Accounting Research, 24(2), 122-139.
Ding, R, HC Dekker, and T Groot (2013). Risk, partner selection and contractual control in interfirm
relationships. Management Accounting Research, 24(2), 140-155.
Ditillo, A ( 2004). Dealing with uncertainty in knowledge-intensive firms: the role of management control
systems as knowledge integration mechanisms. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 29(3-4), 401-421.
Dodgson, M, D M Gann, and A Salter ( 2002). The intensification of innovation. International Journal of
Innovation Management, 6(1), 53-83.
Dougherty, D and Hardy, C (1996). Sustained product-innovation in large-mature organisations: Overcoming
innovation-to-organisation problems. Academy of Management Journal, 39(5), 1120-1153.
Dowling, C (2009). Appropriate Audit Support System Use: The Influence of Auditor, Audit Team, and Firm
Factors. The Accounting Review, 84(3), 771–810.
Ezzamel, M (1990). The impact of environmental uncertainty, managerial autonomy, and size on budget
characteristics. Management Accounting Research, 1(3), 181-197.
Finch, D., O’Reilly, N., Hillenbrand, C. and Abeza, G.( 2015). Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: An
Examination of the Interdisciplinary Foundation of Relationship Marketing. Journal of Relationship
Marketing, 14, 171-196.
Galbraith, J (1973). Designing complex organizations. Addison Wesley Publishing Company.
Gassmann, O (2006). Opening up the innovation process: Towards an agenda. R&D Management, 36(3),
223–228.
Gefen, D and Straub, D (2005). A practical guide to factorial validity using PLS-Graph: tutorial and annotated
example. Communications of the AIS, 19, 91-109.
Geyskens, I, JBEM Steenkamp and N Kumar (2006). Make, buy, or ally: a transaction cost theory meta –
analysis. Academy of Management Journal, 49(3), 519-543.
Giacobbe, F and Booth, P (2009). Controlling International Joint Ventures: An Investigation of Australian
Parent Partners. Australian Accounting Review, 19(2), 103-116.
Gordon, LA and Narayanan, VK (1984). Management accounting systems, perceived environmental uncertainty
and organizational structure: an empirical investigation. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 9(1),
33-47.
Griffin, A (1997). The effect of project and process characteristics on product development cycle time. Journal of
Marketing Research, 34(1), 24-35.

37

Gulati, R and Singh, H (1998). The architecture of cooperation: managing coordination costs and appropriation
concerns in strategic alliances. Administrative Science Quarterly, 43(4), 781-814.
Hansen, A and Jönsson, S (2005). Target costing and coordination – Framing cost information sharing in new
product development, In S Jönsson and J Mouritsen (Eds.) Accounting in Scandinavia – The northern
lights. Liber and Copenhagen Business School Press.
Hartmann, F and Slapničar, S (2009). How formal performance evaluation affects trust between superior and
subordinate managers. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 34(6-7), 722-737.
Haustein, E, R Luther, and P Schuster ( 2014). Management control systems in innovation companies: a
literature based framework. Journal of Management Control, 24(4), 343-382.
Heide, JB and John, G (1990). Alliances in industrial purchasing: The determinants of joint action in buyersupplier relationships. Journal of Marketing Research, 27(1), 24-36.
Hoecht, A and Trott, P (2006). Innovation risks of strategic outsourcing. Technovation, 26(5-6), 672 –681.
Hopwood, AG (1976). Accounting and Human Behavior. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Kamminga, PE and van der Meer-Kooistra, J (2007). Management control patterns in joint venture
relationships: a model and an exploratory study. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 32(1/2), 131154.
Kang, M, X Wu, P Hong, K Park, and Y Park (2014). The role of organizational control in outsourcing
practices: An empirical study. Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management, 20(3), 177–185.
Kerssens-van Drongelen, IC and Bilderbeek, J (2009). R&D performance measurement: more than choosing a set
of metrics. R&D Management, 29(1), 35-46.
Kim, J and Wilemon, D (2003). Sources and assessment of complexity in NPD projects. R&D Management,
33(1), 15-30.
Kirsch, LS (1997). Portfolios of control modes and IS project management. Information Systems Research, 8(3),
215-239.
Langfield-Smith, K (2008). The relations between transactional characteristics, trust and risk in the start-up phase of a
collaborative alliance. Management Accounting Research, 19(4), 344-364.
Langfield-Smith, K and Smith, D (2003). Management control systems and trust in outsourcing relationships.
Management Accounting Research, 14(3), 281-307.
Lau, CM and Roopnarain, K (2014). The effects of nonfinancial and financial measures on employee motivation to
participate in target setting. The British Accounting Review, 46(3), 228-247.
Lawrence, P and Lorsch, J (1967). Organization and Environment. Irwin.
Li, Y, F Ye, and C Sheu (2014). Social capital, information sharing and performance: Evidence from China.
International Journal of Operations and Production Management, 34(11), 1440-1462.
Lichtenthaler, U (2008). Integrated Roadmaps for Open Innovation. Research Technology Management, 51(3), 4549.
Luo, Y ( 2008). Procedural fairness and interfirm cooperation in strategic alliances. Strategic Management
Journal, 29(1), 27-46.
Mahama, H ( 2006). Management control systems, cooperation and performance in strategic supply
relationships: a survey in the mines. Management Accounting Research, 17(3), 315-339.
McCarthy, IP and BR Gordon (2011). Achieving contextual ambidexterity in R&D organizations; a management
control approach. R&D Management, 41(3), 240-258.
Merchant, K A (1985). Control in Business Organizations. Pitman, Boston.
Merchant, K and Otley, D (2007). A review of the literature on control and accountability. In Chapman, C.S.
Hopwood, A. and Shields, M. (Eds), The Handbook of Management Accounting Research, Elsevier,
Oxford, pp. 785-806
Meyer, MH and Utterback, JM (1995). Product development cycle time and commercial success. IEEE
Transactions on Engineering Management, 42, 297-304.
Miller, PB, JL Moll, and T O’Leary (2011). Managing inter-firm interdependencies in R&D investment:
Insights
from
the
semiconductor
industry.
Chartered
Institute
of
Management
Accountants
(CIMA),<http://www.cimaglobal.com/Documents/Thought_leadership_docs/
Organizational%20management/RD-invest-report.pdf>. accessed on 31 March, 2013.
Mohr, JJ and Sengupta, S (2005). Managing the paradox of inter-firm learning: the role of governance
mechanisms. Journal of Business and Industrial Marketing, 17(4), 282-301.
Mouritsen, J, A Hansen and CO Hansen (2009). Short and long translations: Management accounting calculations

38

and innovation management. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 34(6-7), 738-754.
Nooteboom, B (2004.) Inter-firm Collaboration, Learning and Networks. Routledge, London.
Ouchi, WG (1977). The Relationship between Organizational Structures and Organizational Control.
Administrative Science Quarterly, 22(1), 95-l 12.
Ouchi, WG (1979) A Conceptual Framework for the Design of Organizational Control Mechanisms. Management
Science, 2 5 ( 9 ) , 833-849.
Otley, DT and Berry, AJ (1994). Case study research in management accounting and control. Management
Accounting Research, 5(1), 45-65.
Otley, D, J Broadbent, and AJ Berry (1995). Research in Management Control: An Overview of its
Development. British Journal of Management, 6, S1, S31-S44.
Perrow, C (1970). Organizational analysis: a sociological review. Wadsworth Publishing Company.
Petter, S, D Straub, and A Rai (2007). Specifying formative constructs in information systems research. MIS
Quarterly, 31(4), 623-656.
Revilla, E and Knoppen, D (2015). Building knowledge integration in buyer-supplier relationships: The critical role
of strategic supply management and trust. International Journal of Operations and Production Management,
35(10), 1408-1436.
Ringle, CM, S Wende, J M Becker (2015). Smartpls 3, Boenningsted: SmartPLS GmbH, Retrieved from
http://www.smartpls.com.
Rosell, DT (2014). Implementation of Open Innovation Strategies: A Buyer-Supplier Perspective. International
Journal of Innovation Management, 18(6), DOI: 10.1142/S1363919614400131
Rundquist, J (2012). The ability to integrate different types of knowledge and its effect on innovation performance.
International Journal of Innovation Management, 16(2), 1-32.
Simonin, BL (1997). The importance of collaborative know-how: an empirical test of the learning organization.
Academy of Management Journal, 40(5), 1150-1174.
Simons, R ( 1987). Accounting control systems and business strategy: an empirical analysis. Accounting,
Organizations and Society, 12(4), 357-375.
Simons, R (1995). Levers of control. Harvard Business School Press, Boston.
Smets, LPM, F Langerak, and MV Tatikonda (2016). Collaboration between competitors’ NPD teams; in search
of effective modes of management control. R&D Management, 46(1), 244-260.
Soutar, GN and M M McNeil ( 2008). Corporate Innovation: Some Australian Experiences. Prometheus:
Critical Studies in Innovation, 11(2), 200-218.
Speklé, RF (2001). Explaining management control structure variety: a transaction cost economics perspective.
Accounting, Organizations and Society, 26(4-5), 419-441.
Tainter, JA (1988). The Collapse of Complex Societies, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
Thompson, JD (1967). Organizations in action. McGraw Hill.
Triguero, A and Córcoles, D ( 2013). Understanding innovation: An analysis of persistence for Spanish
manufacturing firms. Research Policy, 42(2), 340-352.
Van de Ven, AH, A L Delbecq, and RJr Koenig ( 1976). D eterminants of coordination modes within
organizations. American Sociological Review, 41(2), 322-338.
Van De Vrande, V, PJ De Jong, W Vanhaverbeke and M De Rochemont ( 2009). Open Innovation in
SMEs: Trends, Motives and Management Challenges. Technovation, 29(6-7), 423-437.
Van der Meer-Kooistra, J and Scapens, RW (2008). The governance of lateral relations between and within
organizations. Management Accounting Research, 19(4), 365-384.
Van der Meer-Kooistra, J and Scapens, RW (2015). Governing product co-development projects: The role of
minimal structures. Management Accounting Research, 28, 68-91.
Van der Meer-Kooistra, J and Vosselman, EGJ (2000). Management control of inter-firm transactional
relationships: the case of industrial renovation and maintenance. Accounting, Organizations and Society
25(1), 51–77.
Vélez, ML J M Sánchez, and C lvarez-Dardet, C ( 2008). M anagement control systems as interorganizational trust builders in evolving relationships: Evidence from a longitudinal case study.
Accounting, Organizations and Society, 33(7-8), 968-994.
Verona, G (1999). A resource-based view of product development. Academy of Management Review, 24(1), 132–
142.
Walter, J, C Lechner, and F W Kellermanns ( 2008). Disentangling Alliance Management Processes:

39

Decision Making, Politicality, and Alliance Performance. Journal of Management Studies, 45(3), 530560.
Wilkins, AL and Ouchi, WG ( 1983). Efficient cultures: exploring the relationship between culture and
organizational performance. Administrative Science Quarterly, 28(3), 468-481.
Williamson, O (1991). Comparative economic organization: the analysis of discrete structural alternatives.
Administrative Science Quarterly, 36(2), 269-296.
Ylinen, M and Gullkvist, B (2014). The effects of organic and mechanistic control in exploratory and
exploitative innovations. Management Accounting Research, 25(1), 93-112.
Zhao, R ( 2003). Transition in R & D management control system: case study of a biotechnology institute in
China. Journal of High Technology, 14(4), 213-229.

40

